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Abstract
We develop a theory of institutional transition from dictatorship to minority dominant-based
regimes. We depart from the standard political transition framework a` la Acemoglu-Robinson
in four essential ways: (i) population is heterogeneous, there is a minority/majority split, het-
erogeneity being generic, simply reflecting subgroup size; (ii) there is no median voter in the
post-dictatorship period, political and economic competition is favorable to the minority (fiscal
particularism); (iii) (windfall) resources are introduced, and (iv) we distinguish between labor
income and resources, and labor supply is endogenous. We first document empirically fiscal partic-
ularism, its connection with resource endowment, and the impact of both on revolutionary bursts.
Second, we construct a full-fledged model incorporating the four characteristics outlined above. We
show, among others, that polarization is a sufficient condition for revolutions, while resource rents
are not: they do matter though when polarization is low. In agreement with our empirical facts,
countries engaging in revolutions tend to be slightly less resource-rich than other countries. We
also outline the interplay between resource rents, polarization and labor market conditions at the
dawn of institutional change. Our theory is appropriate to understand the institutional dynamics
in highly homogeneous resource-rich countries, which after post-independence autocratic regimes,
turn to be dominated by minorities, Algeria being the paradigmatic case.
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1 Introduction
In the two last decades, an abundant economic literature has been devoted to the mech-
anisms of institutional change, roughly the transition from dictatorship to democracy.
Perhaps the best representative of this strong political economy stream is the book of
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006); see also Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001). The
basic story underlying the theory of institutional change developed in this literature is
typically driven by revolutions by the people and for the people to use the expressions of
the political scientists Albertus and Menaldo (2018). In short, the unequal redistribution
of income by a ruling elite induces the population to revolt provided the cost of revolting
is low enough compared to the grievance caused by the perceived inequality. In the basic
story, population is homogeneous and so is the elite. The revolution is launched by the
population, it is by the people. The costs incurred are typically twofold: coordination
costs as it is the case for any collective action, and all the potential costs related to
the degree of vulnerability (Boucekkine et al., 2016) or entrenchment (Caselli and Tesei,
2016) of the ruling elite, typically determining the extent and ferocity of repression use.
Also in the standard theory, the revolution is for the people: in particular, the fiscal
policy which is in the iron hands of the elite under dictatorship (and thus, it being the
source of inequality and grievance), turns to be determined by the median voter after
revolution and the rise of democracy. Incidentally, this view of the democratic transition
goes together with the belief that democracies do foster redistribution from the rich to
the poor and end up delivering robust welfare states. This has been undoubtedly the
case in Western Europe after the Second World War and it is also roughly consistent
with the observed distributional impact of the more recent democratization waves in
Latin America and Eastern Europe (see details in Albertus and Menaldo, 2018).
While this rosy story of the transition from authoritarianism to democracy by the
people and for the people has been of course challenged and enriched in many respects (to
the point that several authors have proposed convincing models in which such a transi-
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tion cannot occur under some circumstances making permanent dictatorship preferable,
see for example Shen, 2007), it remains the benchmark theory in the political economy
literature. This is by no way the case in the political science literature, as illustrated
for example the highly influential books of Haggard and Kaufman (2016) and Albertus
and Menaldo (2018). For the latter distinguished political scientists, the very definition
of the above mentioned transition as a benchmark can be heavily questioned nowadays,
to be precise: for the late-2000s (Haggard and Kaufman, 2016, page 1). This would
clearly call into question the relevance of a large number of related economic papers
for this most recent period. A first series of facts questioning the benchmark theory is
what Haggard and Kaufman call “backsliding from democracy”, that is the incapacity
of some democracies to consolidate with reversal to certain types of autocracy. Among
the countries having experienced such institutional paths, the latter authors cite Russia,
Venezuela, Kenya, Turkey or Hungary. Our reading of the “backsliding from democ-
racy” cases outlined by Haggard and Kaufman, in the light of the standard mechanisms
displayed in the beginning of this introduction, is the following: while the ruling leaders
have come to power democratically, that is they have been chosen by the people, they end
up governing, not for the people, not only by restricting civil and political liberties, but
also by taking economic advantage of their office, ultimately undermining the supposed
superiority of democracies in terms of redistributive justice. Of course, the idea that
democracies may not be stable is not new in Economics.1 However, the recent political
science literature mentioned above pushes much further the distrust in the democratic
model and its presumed virtues.
The picture is even more pessimistic for Albertus and Menaldo (2018). In their intro-
ductory chapter (“A deeper critic of democracy”), these authors argue: “...democracy is
made from above and designed to reflect the interest of former autocratic elites. At first
1For example, in the new Lipset-like theories of modernization, the role of human capital accumulation
is put forward not only to favor democratization but also to build democracies on stable bases. See for
example, Glaeser et al. (2007).
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blush, this might seem like a rather rash accusation. But consider the expression of the
social contract at the core of every modern polity: its constitution. From 1800 to 2006,
only 34 percent of new democracies began with a constitution that they created themselves
or inherited from a past episode of democratic rule in their country”. A key aspect un-
derlying the latter reasoning is that while institutional change may be indeed operated
by the people through violent or non-violent revolutions, the new emerging “democratic”
rules may not or even are not likely to be for the people. A typical example is South
Africa, where the white minority has kept dominating the political and economic rules of
this country despite the apparent equality in political and economic rights, irrespective
of ethnic origins, after the end of the apartheid regime. This is a clear example of the
so-called elite-led democracies as the rules of the new democratic regimes, coming after
the demise of the preceding autocracies, are typically imposed by the former ruling elite.
A related more general question, which is tackled in this paper, is how the majority
of population during and/or in the aftermath of a revolutionary episode, closing up an
autocratic episode, can leave the economic and/or political controls to a minority, be it
or not related to the ousted dictators. In this paper, we precisely seek to uncover some
of the essential conditions under which dominant minorities can emerge in the course
of institutional change. Of course, the inherent research question may be somehow easy
when it comes to the case where these minorities are connected to the falling autocracy as
they are typically the most informed about the functioning of the state and its economy.
Because they hold such a valuable informational (and often technological) advantage,
they typically come back to the front of the scene after a short period of distrust. This
clearly happened in Tunisia a few years after the 2011 Jasmin revolution, and it is no
question that many current dominant minorities in the world are of this sort.2 In this
paper, we abstract away from the political, ethnic or economic origins of the minorities,
2In the case of South Africa, no waiting period was observed before involving the white minority in the
governing bodies of the post-apartheid regime, due probably to the exceptional credibility of Mandela’s
leadership.
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and assume that they do not have necessarily ties with the former autocracy and no
particular associated informational or skill advantage.
Precisely, mimicking the standard democratic transition model, we study the con-
ditions under which a majority of people revolt against a dictatorship to fall into an
alternative regime in which the associated economic system, including redistribution (in
a sense which will be clearer here below), is driven by dominant minorities. Since we also
assume, as explained above, that these minorities need not have any relationship with
the former autocracy, our theory is not really a theory of elite-led democracies in the
sense of Albertus and Menaldo (2018), though it shares with the latter that despite the
institutional change is by the people, through revolutions, the new regime is dominated
by a minority or (new in our case) elite, and is certainly not for the people. A key novel
ingredient with respect to the institutional change models a` la Acemoglu and Robinson
is the heterogeneity of population: there are a minority and a majority. Our model is
agnostic as to the origins of this heterogeneity, it can be of any sort, but in our theory,
it is reducible to a number: the fraction of population which belongs to the minority
group. Under autocracy, the elite treats exactly in the same way both the minority and
majority: no advantage is given to the minority in particular. This is pretty much the
case in a wide range of dictatorships, in particular those of the communist type, which
often attempt to erase any apparent trace of group singularity. While our theory has not
been built up to study specifically the latter case, it is also meaningful to understand the
institutional dynamics of countries with highly homogeneous population in resource-rich
countries with an initial (typically post-independence) autocratic regime. See below.
A key and original ingredient of the model is the modeling of the dominance features
of the minority. In this respect, we build on an abundantly documented indicator, fiscal
particularism. Section 2 below provides the necessary empirical support, taken from the
V-Dem (Varieties of Democracy) database. When social and infrastructural spending
in the national budget goes to a particular group (region, ethnic group, politically-
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connected group,...), that is when this spending does not benefit everyone (no public
good), we refer to this situation as a case of fiscal particularism. Accordingly, the
dominant minorities in our model are precisely those which capture a fraction of public
spending which is above their demographic weight. To make our research question even
trickier, we consider the case where the latter fraction is inversely proportional to its
demographic weight. Under which conditions the majority of population would prefer
the ruling of such an extreme dominant minority (or such an extreme fiscal particularism)
than living under dictatorship?
Needless to say, the response to this question also depends on how income is generated
in the model and on individual preferences. Again differently from the standard demo-
cratic transition model, we consider two income sources: windfall income (or resources)
and labor income. Moreover, individuals enjoy leisure, the theories a` la Acemoglu and
Robinson do not account for this ingredient. We believe that this is an important addi-
tion to the model as political regimes do not only differ in their redistribution policies,
they can also drastically alter the incentives to work. This is documented in Section 2
here below.
Two remarks are worth mentioning at this stage. First of all, we could have also
postulated heterogeneity with respect to individual preferences. We don’t: we focus here
on a single aspect of minority dominance, that is fiscal particularism, already outlined
above. In our model, the actual extent of particularism is generically the result of a
Stackelberg game whose leader is the minority. We deliberately leave aside all types of
“psychological” differences between minority and majority members. In particular, we
do not assume any difference in the disutility from working.
Second, we introduce resources in our story, not only for the sake of generality.
As documented in Section 2, fiscal particularism is more significant in resource-rich
countries, and this is no surprise given the level of rent-seeking in these countries and
the inherent emergence of local or regional dominant groups. Within our framework, we
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are able to analyze the interplay of fiscal particularism with population fractionalization
(in particular, with the degree of polarization) and with level of resource windfalls and
participation in the labor market as well. We show, among others, that polarization
is a sufficient condition for revolutions, while resource rents are not: they do matter
though when polarization is low. Consistently with the empirical regularities identified
in Section 2, we also find that countries engaging in revolutions tend to be slightly
less resource-rich than other countries. As mentioned above, our theory is particularly
appropriate to understand the institutional dynamics in highly homogeneous resource-
rich countries, which after a post-independence autocratic communist-like regime, turn
to be dominated by minorities. The case of Algeria is paradigmatic in this respect.
Relation to the literature
Our paper is related to several streams of the Economic and Political Science lit-
erature. Focusing on the former, our work is obviously related to the democratization
theories developed by Acemoglu and Robinson, notably in their 2006 book. Indeed, we
show in this paper that our model does degenerate into the basic Acemoglu and Robinson
model in the absence of population heterogeneity and the associated fiscal particularism.
Because of the resource ingredient, our paper is also related to the abundant literature
on conflicts and institutional change in resource-rich countries (Ross, 2001; Collier and
Hoeﬄer, 2004; Friedman, 2006; Hodler, 2006; Alexeev and Conrad, 2009; Haber and
Menaldo, 2011; Robinson, Torvik and Verdier, 2006 and 2014; Boucekkine et al., 2016;
Caselli and Tesei, 2016, to cite a few). In terms of theoretical contribution, key differ-
ences with respect to this literature are population heterogeneity (minority/majority),
fiscal particularism and work incentives. Another (subsequent) major difference is that
we do not study democratic transitions in the traditional sense of median voter decision-
making but transitions to democracies (in the sense that the regime change is driven by
the majority) dominated by minorities.
Our paper is also related to a large literature in Political Economy and Public Eco-
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nomics dealing with the political and developmental role of minorities. For example, the
fiscal particularism story can be related to the “paradox of power” problem studied in
the public choice literature in particular (see the seminal paper of Hirshleifer, 1985, for
example). In addition, and more related to our redistribution story, it is widely admitted
in the economic literature that the presence of majority and minority groups in society
may be highly important in this respect. Easterly and Levine (1997), Roemer (1998),
Alesina et al. (1999), Shayo (2009) find that diversity impacts public good provision.
As such, societies populated by majority and minorities groups are likely to have lower
levels of goods that are publicly provided. However, these works do not concentrate on
the character - particularistic vs. universalistic - of the public good but on its overall
provision.
Further research has shown that there exists a tendency for the groups with de facto
power to transfer higher benefits to members of their group. In this vein, Besley et.
al. (2004) analyze this issue, showing that sharing the politician’s group identity is a
means to obtain greater proportion of publicly provided private goods. Banerjee et al.
(2005) and Banerjee and Somanathan (2007) find that group identities are correlated
with access to public goods in India. Kimenyi (2006) show that in African countries
ethnic groups that control the government will adopt a particularistic redistribution
of the public good. Bandiera and Levy (2010) find that democratic policy outcomes
are closer to the preferences of the elites when there is diversity in preferences among
the poor majority. Finally, the literature on conflicts in fractionalized societies (see for
example, Esteban and Ray, 2011) has already stressed the role of polarization in conflicts
but it is not about institutional change per se.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main stylized facts on which
our model is based. Section 3 describes our set-up in detail. Section 4 delivers the main
outcomes of our analysis concerning institutional change in the presence of dominant
minorities. The roles of resources, labor market and the polarization level of population
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are highlighted. Section 5 concludes.
2 Stylized Facts
2.1 Government spending and taxation
Political regimes may choose to allocate most of their expenditures to a small and selected
fraction of the population. To illustrate this, we use data from the V-Dem (Varieties
of Democracy) database, covering the period 1960-2018.3 Our indicator of particular-
istic spending corresponds to the answers of country experts to the following question,
subsequently mapped on a linearized ordinal scale (ranging from about -3 to 3): “ Con-
sidering the profile of social and infrastructural spending in the national budget, how
‘particularistic’ or ‘public goods’ are most expenditures? ”; 0 (almost all of the social
and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic [narrowly targeted]) to 4 (almost all
social and infrastructure expenditures are public goods in character [intended to benefit
everyone]). The scale of this indicator is inverted such as a larger value implies more
particularistic spending.
Using the values of Western Europe and North America (WENA) as reference points,
Figure 1 shows that particularistic spending has been a consistent feature of political
regimes in other regions, especially in Latin America and Caribbean (LAC), Middle East
and North Africa (MENA), and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Nevertheless, the nineties
appear to have been a turning points towards less particularistic spending, except in
post-communist Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA) and MENA countries. One
may worry that particularistic spending is the consequence of insufficient resources.
However, Figure 2 shows that, even after adjusting for differences in income per capita,
a similar picture emerges.
Figure 2 has shown that, for a given level of income per capita, countries can diverge
3https://www.V-Dem.net/
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in their particularistic spending. Figure 3 indicates that one factor associated with this
divergence is natural resources abundance. Resource-rich countries tend to engage more
in particularistic spending. Figure 4 highlights that public spending on health, a widely
available indicator of redistribution, tends to be smaller in these countries than other
countries. As pointed out by Ebeke et al (2015), for various reasons, redistribution
may rather take the form of energy subsidies in resource-rich countries. Figure 5 in-
deed reports that energy subsidies are much larger in resource-rich countries. Turning
to taxation, Figure 6 depicts the relationship between the taxation of individuals and
natural resources abundance. Revenues from the taxation of the income (from labor and
capital) of individuals, as a share of GDP, tend to be lower in resource-rich countries.
Natural resources abundance may lead to a fall in labor force supply. We use the
share of young people (15-24 years old) who are not in education, employment, or training
(NEET) as a crude indicator of the willingness of people to supply their labor. Figure 7
shows that the relationship between the NEET share and natural resources abundance
is positive, but only for the most resource-abundant countries.
2.2 Revolutions
The V-Dem database reports 12 different types of processes that can lead to the end of
a political regime (e.g. coup, loss in civil war, popular uprising, peaceful political liber-
alization). We consider a revolution to have taken place if a popular uprising has played
a role in ending a regime. Furthermore, we only consider pro-democratic transitions:
the V-Dem electoral democracy index (the existence of free and fair elections) must be
higher in the following regime. Finally, given that some regimes are themselves transi-
tion regimes, we impose that the end of the new regime (which may not have occurred
at the end of our sample) must occur at least three years after the fall of the previous
regime. Figure 8 highlights that pro-democratic transitions have been recurring events
since 1960, with a global peak in the nineties. Revolutions tend to be much less frequent
10
Figure 1: Particularistic spending, by period and region
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Notes: Data come from the V-Dem database. Decennial periods. Regions according to World Bank
classification. ASIA: East Asia and Pacific + South Asia. ECA: Eastern Europe and Central Asia. LAC: Latin
America and Caribbean. MENA: Middle East and North Africa. SSA: Sub Saharan Africa. WENA: Western
Europe and North America.
Figure 2: Particularistic spending, adjusted for income per capita
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Values have been adjusted for the log of income per capita (constant 2010 US$), taken from the World Bank
World Development Indicators (WDI) (http://wdi.worldbank.org/) using a locally weighted regression (‘lowess’).
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Figure 3: Particularistic spending in resource-rich countries
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Notes: Data come from the V-Dem database and Haber and Menaldo (2011). Natural resources abundance
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transformation (IHS) (to deal with outliers and zero values). Values of both variables have been adjusted for the
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Figure 4: Health spending in resource-rich countries
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Figure 5: Energy subsidies in resource-rich countries
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Figure 6: Individual taxation in resource-rich countries
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World Bank WDI, using a multivariate locally weighted regression. IHS: inverse hyperbolic sine transformation.
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Figure 7: Share of NEET young people in resource-rich countries
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than other types of transitions. In our sample, we observe 30 revolutions out of 227
pro-democratic transitions (13% of total).
Revolutions, in comparison to other pro-democratic transitions, ought to require
the coordination of a large number of people. The V-Dem database provides some
information on the degree of anti-system opposition at a given point of time. We use
the responses, subsequently mapped on a linearized ordinal scale (ranging from about
-3 to 4), to the following question “ Among civil society organizations, are there anti-
system opposition movements? ” Responses, on the original scale, can vary from 0
(no, or very minimal) to 4 (there is a very high level of anti-system movement activity,
posing a real and present threat to the regime). To be considered, the movement must
have a mass base and an existence separate from normal electoral competition. Figure
9 shows that revolutions are characterized by ex ante stronger anti-system opposition
than other transitions. In the same Figure, we also report the degree of natural resources
abundance. Countries engaging in revolutions tend to be slightly less resource-rich than
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Figure 8: Number and types of pro-democratic transitions
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other countries.
While a popular uprising can lead to a democratic transition, this does not mean
that all social groups in the following regime have equal power. The V-Dem database
provides some information on the distribution of political power across social groups
at a given point of time. We use the responses, subsequently mapped on a linearized
ordinal scale (ranging from about -3 to 4), to the following question “ Is political power
distributed according to social groups? ” Responses, on the original scale, can vary
from 0 (political power is monopolized by one social group comprising a minority of the
population) to 4 (all social groups have roughly equal political power or there are no
strong ethnic, caste, linguistic, racial, religious, or regional differences to speak of). We
consider the next regime to be minority-dominated if the ordinal index takes the values
of 0 or 1 (monopolization of political power by a minority of the population). 30% of the
post-revolution regimes are minority-dominated. Figure 10 shows that for these regimes,
minority domination was also a feature pre-revolution (in the Figure, the scale of the
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Figure 9: Initial characteristics of different transitions
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linearized political power index is inverted such as a larger value implies more unequal
political power). In addition, there is a clear relationship, pre- and post-revolution
between minority domination and particularism. Minority domination is associated with
more particularistic public spending. Post-revolution, particularism tends to fall, but
much more strongly in majority-dominated (i.e. not minority-dominated) regimes.
3 The Set-up
3.1 General specifications
As in the standard institutional change theory (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006), we
consider an economy initially populated by two groups: a non-benevolent dictator of
size x < 1 and a group of citizens of size 1. Initially, the political regime in place is
an autocracy taking all the relevant economic decisions, in particular redistribution (for
example of natural resources windfalls) or taxation (say, of labor income), not speaking
about the exclusive use of coercion and repression. The unique potentially powerful
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Figure 10: Minority domination and particularism in revolution-led democratic transitions
−
1.5
−
1
−
.
5
0
.
5
1
Me
dia
n v
alu
es
NOT MINORITY DOMINATED AFTER REVOL
Minority domination before Minority domination after
Particularism before Particularism after
Notes: Data come from the V-Dem database. Before reported values: average of values one and two years before
transition. After values: median values over the life of the post-revolution regime.
lever in the hands of citizens is the possibility to revolt against the autocracy, which
would pave the way to democracy or at least to a more democratic regime in a sense to
be defined later. If the revolutionary threat is credible, the autocracy may adjust their
economic and political decisions to curb it in order to retain power when possible. If
not, a political regime change will occur. All the action takes place in one unit of time,
the model is static.
As outlined in the introduction, we depart from the standard framework just de-
scribed above in four essential ways. First of all, we consider that the population is
not homogeneous. We stick here to the most generic heterogeneity: citizens are divided
in two subgroups, a minority and majority, no matter which deep reason is behind this
subdivision (ethnic, economic, religious or whatever). Here, heterogeneity is generic, it is
simply reflected in the subgroup size. Second, citizens’ group membership is an essential
determinant of civil conflicts and political competition, and can hardly be omitted in
any comprehensive analysis of endogenous institutional change, starting with revolutions
and civil wars. As explained in Section 2, this shows up neatly in the particularistic na-
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ture of public expenditures, which captures the unequal distribution of political power
across subgroups of citizens and may be at the onset of severe civil conflicts. While
the distinctive political and economic behavior of minorities has been invoked in several
theories of political competition (see again, Hirshleifer and his paradox of power, 1992,
and the very long sequence of papers devoted to this paradox), their role in political
regime change has not been yet treated in a full-fledged formal setting although sev-
eral recent contributions in political sciences (see again Albertus and Menaldo, 2018)
have documented a decisive role of such minorities in numerous regime changes, which
we have already accounted for in Section 2. Here, we provide a simple theory con-
necting the so-called dominant minority with institutional change. Third, we introduce
(windfall) resources, which plays a central role in the literature of civil conflicts (see for
example, Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2004). More importantly, incorporating resources in the
model allows to address the so-called resource curse (see again Robinson et al., 2006)
in a new framework with a minority/majority structure, therefore allowing potential
interactions with another powerful engine of conflicts, population polarization. Fourth,
we distinguish between labor income and resources, and labor supply is endogenous. As
we have mentioned in Section 2, different institutional regimes might induce different
work incentives, and the presence of resource redistribution adds another driver for these
incentives, the overall effect being far nontrivial.
Hereafter, we describe the general ingredients of the theory. Consistently with the
discussion above, we postulate that citizens are divided in two subgroups of different
size: they might belong either to the majority (M) of size q, or to the minority (m) of
size 1− q. Of course q ∈ (12 , 1). There are two main sources of income in this economy:
resource revenues windfalls, R, and the labor income, w, earned by citizens in both the
formal and the informal sector, where w is the exogenous hourly wage rate and l the time
worked or labor supply. Here, we use the simplest specification for resource revenues
(no extraction sector, no dynamics). An interesting possible economic configuration
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opened by the incorporation of resource windfalls is the possibility for citizens to choose
low or even zero labor supply without starving and for the autocrats to play on rent
redistribution not only to satisfy citizens’ consumption needs but also to increase their
utility from leisure. The inclusion of windfall resources into the theory is also consistent
with the fact that a large number of recent revolutionary and regime change episodes
have occurred in resource-rich countries, the Arab spring being the most recent one (see
Section 2). Furthermore, to avoid any source of heterogeneity except size, we assume
that productivity w is the same across groups of citizens.
The utility of the representative agent i = {M,m} at time t is defined over the
consumption of a private good, c and leisure, 1 − l and has the following quasi-linear
form:
Uk,i = ck,i + γ ln[1− lk,i] (1)
with k = {A,D}, the political regime at time t: autocracy (A) or democracy (D)
with k = A at t = 0. Parameter γ > 0 defines the weight of leisure with respect to
consumption, i.e. the marginal rate of substitution of leisure in terms of consumption.4
The assumption of a quasi-linear utility function is the first departure from the typical
model of the institutional changes literature. This function is able to capture the role
that labor market and income taxation might have on the emergence of revolutionary
movements and linearity in consumption is needed for analytical tractability. We will
highlight along the way the specific implications of the log-linear specifications and their
connection with the stylized facts highlighted in Section 2 will become apparent.
In the rest of this Section, we proceed as follows. We first characterize citizens’ deci-
sions in the autocratic regime for given redistribution policy, after a couple of important
remarks on how we deal with citizens and income heterogeneities. Then we describe the
post-revolution regime driven by a dominant minority with a special emphasis on the
4Preferences for leisure are the same in the citizens population. Indeed, there is no reason to suppose
that they are different. This reasonable simplification allow us to concentrate on the role played by the
size heterogeneity and obtain general results that are not driven by other types of heterogeneity.
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definition of particularistic public expenditures and the game-theoretic foundations of
minority dominance.
3.2 The autocratic regime
Initially, the autocrats hold all the political and economic power, the country lives in
full autocracy. As in the seminal democratization theory developed by Acemoglu and
Robinson (2001), the autocrats are the strategic leader of the game. They set their
redistribution, taxation and repression policies to cope with the revolutionary threats,
anticipating the reaction of citizens to their policies. In other words, the autocrats
anticipate the reaction functions of citizens to their policies, and are assumed to identify
accurately the revolutionary threats, allowing them to adjust policies to remain as long
as possible in office. In this subsection, we characterize the latter reaction functions.
With respect to the standard theory a` la Acemoglu and Robinson, two new questions
arise. One has to do with citizens’ heterogeneity. Autocrats may not treat the minority
in the same way as the majority. Things can go in all ways: the dictator may treat better
either the majority or the minority or may not wish to discriminate between the two
groups. In the recent years, there has been a growing literature both in political science
and economics on the so-called liberal democracies, that is democracies guaranteeing the
civil rights of minorities. Mukand and Rodrik (2015) is an illustration of such a literature
stream in economics.5 In other contexts, elite may rely on minorities to consolidate their
position in office, such as in autocracies dominated by an ethnic minoritarian group (a
very know example is Saddam Hussein’s long reign over Irak backed by a quite thin Sunni
minority). Finally, as in former communist dictatorships, the autocrats could fiercely
deny particularity to any group and treat equally (at least apparently) all the citizens.
Here, we assume that the autocrats do not discriminate in any essential way between
the majority and the minority; in particular, the same tax and redistribution rates are
5Yascha Mounk’s best-seller “The People vs Democracy” is a much more visible example of this
growing literature following the rise of populism in the occidental world and Eastern Europe.
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applied to both subgroups. By doing so, we do not aim to specialize in communist
regimes or the like but to shut down a grievance channel in the autocratic phase in order
to focus on pure political competition in the post-autocratic regime as claimed in the
introduction.
The second new specification question has to do with the composition of income
in our model. Contrary to the traditional setting, national income is twofold, resource
windfalls and labor income. The former is redistributed to citizens at a rate, say µA,
and labor income is possibly taxed at a rate τA so that a fraction 1− τA of labor income
remains at the disposal of citizens. Strictly speaking, two fiscal instruments are in the
hands of the dictator. We shall however assume that the autocrats redistribute resource
windfalls and labor income at the same rate, that is: µA = 1−τA. This simplification will
not only ease computations without affecting the generality of our main results, it is also
supported by evidence on resource-rich countries, displayed in Section 2, according to
which large levels of resource revenues redistribution in these countries (when counting
the so-called implicit subsidies, in particular energy subsidies) come together with a
relatively low level of labor income taxation.
In what follows, we shall therefore assume that the autocrats sets a unique redistri-
bution rate, µA, which applies to all citizens, irrespective of their group membership and
the revenue source. This in turn delivers the per capital consumption under autocracy:
cA = (R+ wlA)µA, (2)
the upper-index A being meant for autocracy. Given the choice of redistribution imposed
by the elite, the representative citizen will choose a work effort, lA such that the utility
function (1) is maximized under the constraint (2):
lA = 1− γ
wµA
(3)
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First of all we need to define the threshold µA ≡ γw , giving the minimum share of
income redistributed to citizens for labor supply to be non-negative. Accordingly, we
impose the following constraint:
Constraint 1. Redistribution policy is such that µA ≥ µA with γ < w.
Under the constraint above, particularly the condition on labor productivity, γ < w,
we ensure that µA ∈ (0, 1) and lA ∈ [0, 1). It is worth pointing out that our constraint on
the control set of the dictator (minimum redistribution) does prevent zero redistribution
even in the absence of explicit revolutionary threat. This comes from the log-linear
specification of the utility function: if redistribution tends to 0, then consumption goes
to zero by equation (2) and labor supply becomes infinitely negative (so as to increase
utility from leisure infinitely). We shut down this theoretical (and unrealistic) possibility
by setting the minimal redistribution threshold, µA. Active revolutionary threat would
lead the elite to raise redistribution above this level.
3.3 The post-revolution regime
Let us assume at the moment that a revolution took place and that a new regime has
replaced the initial autocracy (which ends up leaving the country). Of course, revolutions
do not occur systematically and we shall characterize accurately their occurrence in
the next section. Here, we need a couple of preliminary points to properly describe
citizens’ behavior in the post-revolution era. In particular, we need to specify the cost
of revolutions and the role of social groups (minority/majority in our context) in this
process, a new question implied by our heterogeneous population assumption.
Concerning the cost of revolutions, we follow Boucekkine et al. (2016) by assuming
that citizens incur a coordination cost ψ[q] when revolting against the elite. The latter
cost dependent on the degree of population polarization in a precise way to be specified
later. This is the single cost we account for in our setting. Needless to say, we could
have easily dealt with an additional fixed cost reflecting destructions due to popular
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uprising as in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). Without loss of generality, we deliberately
focus on coordination costs, which do depend on population heterogeneity, a feature we
incorporate in our model with the minority/majority split. Since citizens are divided
into majority and minority groups, we reasonably model this coordination cost as an
increasing function of the polarization level of the society, where ψ[q] is an inverted u-
shaped with a maximum in q = 12 . The larger the polarization within citizens, the larger
the cost of the revolution and, therefore, the lower the post-revolution disposal material
pay-off.
Finally, we make two simplifying assumptions. First of all, we remove all sources
of uncertainty from the model: in particular we postulate that the cost of revolution is
deterministic, and unless the autocrats are able to avert the revolution by an appropriate
and feasible policy, the autocracy will be removed provided citizens are better off (in
terms of utility) after revolution. Second, we assume that the revolutionary threat is
only credible if it is backed by the majority. In other words, the support of the minority,
whatever its demographic weight (1 − q < 12), is not a prerequisite for revolutions. Of
course, the demographic weight of the minority, that is polarization, is a fundamental
determinant of revolutions through the coordination cost function, ψ(q), but their direct
intervention in the revolutionary process is not a prerequisite. Again here, we aim to
“sterilize” the direct impact of minority before the revolutionary process. Allowing for
the latter channels will of course reinforce the political and economic relevance of the
minority. We shut them down. As a consequence, to characterize the situations of
potential popular uprisings, we only have to check whether the representative agent of
the majority is better off with a revolution given the characteristics of the autocratic
and post-revolution regimes.
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3.3.1 Group size heterogeneity and redistribution: particularistic redistri-
bution
We now develop the key feature of the set-up, the particularism in public spending
associated with the minority/majority partition of population. Section 2 has already
documented this crucial characteristic of public expenditures for a large sample of coun-
tries, in particular for resource-rich countries. To keep things comparable with the initial
autocratic regime, we assume that the total income earned by any citizen in the post-
revolution regime, that is again labor income and resource rents, is taxed at the same
rate, irrespective of group membership. We shall denote by µi ∈ (0, 1), with i ∈ {M,m},
the after-tax share of total income retained by citizens, which is the exact counterpart
of the redistribution rate, µA under autocracy.6 But while the latter is fixed by the elite
in autocracy, we now assume that µi is determined by the group with the de jure power.
In other words, the distinctive feature of the post-revolution regime in our setting is
that policy (here fiscal policy) is not necessarily determined by the majority but by the
group who owns the political power. This is entirely consistent with the analysis of
Albertus and Menaldo (2018) outlined in the introduction. In following this analysis,
we depart from the median voter specification, which is intensively used to represent
political decision-making in the standard model of democracy.
We now get to the critical point of our model, the modeling of particularistic redis-
tribution. Assume that institutional change does not alter the fundamentals of the labor
market nor the pace of technological progress such that the wage rate remains the same,
equal to w. We also hypothesize the same for the size for resource revenues.7 The total
tax revenue collected by the democratic government at time t writes as follows:
G = (R+ wlM )(1− µi)q + (R+ wlm)(1− µi)(1− q). (4)
6Notice that to have redistribution between groups we must have that µi < 1.
7This is a one-period static model, and as such, it’s only supposed to capture short-term effects.
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Since our economy is populated by agents belonging to different groups, the key point is
to understand how public authorities operate to share public resources between groups
of citizens, here minority versus majority. Given that population is normalized to 1,
we observe that the per-capita public transfer to citizens can be written as λiG. The
parameter λi ∈ [0, 1] determines the type of redistribution system. The standard public
good universalistic scenario necessarily implies λi = 1, ∀i ∈ {M,m}. Put differently,
in this scenario the total tax revenue is equally shared between citizens and everybody
receive a net transfer equal to G.8
The stylized facts provided in Section 2 do not support at all this universalistic
scenario. Instead strong evidence of fiscal particularism has been put forward. We
therefore consider a particularistic use of tax revenues assuming that λi is a function of
the group’s size in the population. As argued in the introduction, the key idea is that
the latter function is inversely related to the relative size of each group. Here we assume
that the total tax revenue is redistributed from the government to each group such that
λM = 1q and λ
m = 11−q , with q >
1
2 . It follows that the redistribution level of resources
for any member of the majority and minority is given by Gq and
G
1−q , respectively.
Accordingly, the net transfer per-capita for any member of the majority and minority is
given by sM = Gq − zM and sm = G1−q − zm respectively, with zM = (R + wlM )(1− µi)
and zm = (R+wlm)(1−µi). Finally, the budget constraints for the representative agent
of the majority (M) and minority (m) group write as:
cM =
[
(R+ wlM )µi + sM
]
(1− ψ[q])
cm =
[
(R+ wlm)µi + sm
]
(1− ψ[q])
8Since heterogeneity drops as λiG = G, the model predicts a tax rate of zero, or µi = 1, independently
from the group who holds the political power. The proof of this claim is in appendix A.1.
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or:
cM =
[
(R+ wlM )µi + (R+ wlm)(1− µi)1− q
q
]
(1− ψ[q]) (5)
cm =
[
(R+ wlm)µi + (R+ wlM )(1− µi) q
1− q
]
(1− ψ[q]) (6)
Equations (5) and (6) define the disposable income and therefore consumption of a
member of the majority (M) and minority (m) respectively under group size-based par-
ticularistic redistribution. Note that the total resource constraint of the economy when
a revolution takes place always check that total income is equal to total consumption:
[R+wlMq+wlm(1−q)](1−ψ[q]) = qcM+(1−q)cm. In other words the resource constraint
of the economy is always binding, since the total transfers, i.e. S ≡ sMq + sm(1 − q)
equals the total tax revenue collected by the government G.
Before getting to the second crucial aspect of our theory, that is how competition sets
in between the minority and majority in the post-revolution regime, it is important to
provide a more accurate characterization of particularism in order to identify precisely
how it is connected with citizens’ decisions. As a preliminary remark, it is worth pointing
out that, as outlined in the introduction, our simple particularistic fiscal scheme is
extreme in the sense, for example, that as the minority size decreases, its share of fiscal
revenues keeps on strictly increasing.9 Our scheme implies that redistribution goes from
the majority to the minority, and the smaller the minority, the more it gets favored by
this scheme. As we have argued above, this characteristic of the problem makes the
main research question even trickier.
It’s possible to characterize more finely the particularistic process. Let us work with
the following indicator of particularism:
P =
(1− q) Sm
(1− q) Sm + q SM .
9In our simple specification, the share λm(q) = 1
1−q goes to infinity when the size of the minority
goes to zero. Replacing this function with bounded λm(q) functions when q tends to 1 does not change
the results qualitatively provided the functions are decreasing in the size of the minority, 1− q.
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Notice that P is entirely consistent with the definition of particularism used in the
database V-Dem exploited in Section 2. Particularism is the share in total transfers
earned by the minority. Using equations (5) and (6) above, it is readily seen that P is
fundamentally endogenous in that it intimately depends on the decisions variables lm
and lM , that is:
P =
q
(
R+ wlM
)
q (R+ wlM ) + (1− q) (R+ wlm) . (7)
It is worth pointing out that while the policy variable µi, does not show up directly
in the expression above, it does matter via the labor supply functions, which are heavily
dependent on policy (as it is already the case in the autocratic regime, see equation (3)).
Note also that our particularism indicator P depends directly and indirectly (via labor
supplies a priori) on all the parameters of the model (w, q and R). The link between
particularism and polarization (as captured by q) is particularly interesting. Finally, it
can be highlighted that our indicator P may also be used under the alternative political
regime, that is autocracy. Tracking the evolution of particularism with institutional
change is another key question that we can touch here. The following proposition might
well be useful in this respect.
Proposition 1. The particularism indicator P checks the following properties:
1. When lm = lM , one gets P = q.
2. If lm > lM , then P < q.
The proof is trivial after substituting the net transfers per capital sm and sM (given
above) in the expression of the indicator P . Proposition 1 is far from surprising: group
size-based particularistic redistribution works as a redistribution scheme from the ma-
jority to the minority for equal labor supplies. When one group works more than the
other, its share of the total fiscal revenue goes down. It can be noticed that when labor
supplies are equalized, the particularism indicator is exactly equal to the size of the
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majority. This allows to connect our fiscal particularism story to the polarization-based
theories of conflicts (see for example, Esteban and Ray, 2011). Notice that when society
tends to be fully polarized (that is q tends to 12), the indicator P tends to
1
2 : the two
groups tend to have the same share of total fiscal revenue. Polarization has a double role
in our theory: on one hand, it makes coordination costs larger and thus it discourages
rebellions, but on the other hand, it increases the prospects of income extraction for
the majority under the particularistic scheme, which might push the majority to revolt
against the initial elite and foster transition to a minority-based post-revolution regime.
Full analysis of this configuration is provided in the rest of this paper. To this end,
we need to specify how economic and political competition sets in the post-revolution
regime.
3.3.2 Political competition in the post-revolution period
We now depict political competition in the post-revolution period. Obviously, this model
should be compatible with the particularistic public spending component of the model.
As clearly outlined in Section 2, based on evidence from V-Dem database, the latter type
of public spending is compatible with the presence of dominant minorities. Therefore,
we shall model political competition in the post-revolution period giving strategic ad-
vantage to the minority. As commented in the introduction, this advantage might derive
from past proximity to the ousted incumbent, but we do not give preference to such
an advantage here for reasons already outlined above. We rather stick to the Algerian
case where during the dictatorship period (under Boumediene presidency, 1965-1978),
minority membership was overlooked (or supposed to be so). Hereafter, we depart from
the median voter specification in the typical models of democratic transition (Acemoglu
and Robinson, 2006) and move to a simple Stackelberg game of political competition
where the minority is the leader.10 Clearly, this modeling is a shortcut. In reality, mi-
10Beside being irrelevant for our study, the case where the leader of the game is the majority is
trivial. One can straightforwardly perform the counterpart computations, which non-surprisingly lead
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nority dominance takes much more sophisticated lobbying and manipulation forms.11
However, our Stackelberg basic modeling captures the two essential features of the mi-
nority dominant-based post-revolution regimes we target: departure from the median
voter and strategic advantage to the minority.
Let us now sketch the game and in particular the timing of the politico-economic
decisions. In the spirit of Stackelberg, the leader, here the minority, is the player who
moves conditionally to the best responses of the other player. This means that the
follower chooses its strategy without knowing the optimal decisions of the leader. Here
comes the timing in the post-revolution period if any. First, the representative agent of
the majority M chooses her work effort lM such that the utility function defined by (1)
is maximized under the budget constraint (5), yielding
lM [µm] = 1− γ
wµm(1− ψ[q]) (8)
Next, the representative agent of the minority chooses her labor supply and the
redistribution policy, i.e. µm, such that the utility function (1) is maximized under the
budget constraint (6), given the reaction function (8). Deriving the two corresponding
first-order conditions of this problem and after a few trivial algebraic operations, one
gets:
lm[µm] = 1− γ
wµm(1− ψ[q]) (9)
and
µm =
2γq
γ(1− q) +√φm[q, γ,R,w] (10)
to µM = 1. Because particularistic spending implies transfers from the majority to the minority, if the
majority were the strategic leader, it would minimize such transfers. Actually, by setting µM = 1, there
is no redistribution, and therefore no particularistic spending. As it transpires from the empirical Section
2, the latter is inherent to the presence of dominant minorities.
11The recent political turmoil and inherent (ongoing) legal processes in Algeria have uncovered a vast
body of such practices that typically bypass the parliament in an otherwise formally democratic multi-
party regime. See https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/algeria-inventing-new-political-rules/.
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with φm[q, γ,R,w] = γ2(q − 1)2 + 4γq(2q − 1)(1 − ψ[q])(R + w) > 0.12 One should
already notice that given the first-order conditions (8) and (9), the labor supplies of
the minority and majority member are equal. This is no surprise as they share the
same log-linear utility function and face the same taxation rate, µm. As repeatedly
commented above, the unique effective difference between the two groups derives from
particularistic spending. We can go a small step further and get all the variables of the
game in closed-form. Indeed, using µm as defined by (10), it is straightforward to derive
the optimal labor supply of citizens in a regime with dominant minorities:
lm = 1− γ(1− q) +
√
φm[q, γ,R,w]
2qw(1− ψ[q]) (11)
To guarantee that the labor supply of citizens and the redistribution policy are in their
admissible intervals, we need one crucial restriction on parameters:
Constraint 2. For given q, preferences for leisure are such that γ < w(1− ψ[q]).
Constraint 2 guarantees that the voted policy is such that µm ∈ (0, 1). Note that if q
is given, as we suppose here, then ψ[q] measures the upper bound of the coordination cost
of the revolution, that is when q = 12 and the citizens’ population is perfectly polarized.
Constraint 2 also implies that the labor supply is always positive and lower than 1 for
any µm ∈ (0, 1). Given the above parameters’ restrictions to guarantee a well-specified
economic problem, the model necessarily predicts that cm > cM . Indeed, since labor
supplies are the same across groups, fiscal particularism implies that P = q, with q > 12 ,
by Proposition 1. In other words, given constant wage rate, minorities are not only
dominant in terms on de jure power, but also in terms of de facto power: their members
consume more goods than the majority group, and enjoy larger welfare (given equality
of leisures across groups).
12We should note that since the problem is quadratic, we do get two solutions for µm. However, the
second order conditions for a maximum are only met for one solution. A proof of this statement is given
in Appendix A.2.
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A few more comparative statics are useful to understand better the determinants of
labor decisions and policy choices.
Proposition 2. Under constraint 2, the following comparative statics hold:
(i) Minority Policy: ∂µ
m
∂w < 0,
∂µm
∂R < 0,
∂µm
∂ψ[q] > 0,
∂µm
∂q < 0;
(ii) Labor supply: ∂l
m
∂w > 0,
∂lm
∂R < 0,
∂lm
∂ψ[q] < 0,
∂lm
∂q ≶ 0;
(iii) Consumption of the minority members: ∂c
m
∂w > 0,
∂cm
∂R > 0,
∂cm
∂ψ[q] < 0,
∂cm
∂q ≶ 0 ;
(iv) Consumption of the majority members: ∂c
M
∂w > 0,
∂cM
∂R > 0,
∂cM
∂ψ[q] < 0,
∂cM
∂q ≶ 0
Proof. The proof is given in appendix B.2.
Some comments are in order here. First of all, the role of coordination costs can
be readily understood. Indeed, the labor supply of both groups negatively depends on
coordination costs as it should be: ∂l
m
∂ψ[q] < 0. This outcome is quite intuitive because
the cost of revolution enters multiplicatively and not additively in the budget constraint
of the representative agent. It therefore plays the same role as a proportional income
tax. The same results are obtained on consumption of both population groups for the
very same reason. As µm is chosen by the minority, it is reasonable to get that overall
that a rising (multiplicative) cost, ψ[q], is compensated by an increase in the after-tax
share of total income retained by citizens.
Now we move to the comparative statics with respect to the two components of
wealth, resource revenues and labor income. Concerning the comparative statics with
respect to the wage rate w, one gets the usual property: ∂l
m
∂w > 0. If people work
more, then they get less welfare from leisure, and thus they would tend to prefer having
more consumption through inter-group redistribution. Therefore, the minority members
would choose µm such that ∂µ
m
∂w < 0. The overall effect of the consumption of both
groups is positive as it should be. Concerning the resource revenues R, we have the
typical wealth effects on the consumption of both groups (positive) and on labor supply
(negative). More interesting, the overall effect of larger resource rents is negative on
31
the after-tax share of total income retained by citizens, µm (or equivalently, positive on
the inter-group redistribution). This is one of the stylized fact highlighted in Section 2,
and we shall use this property intensively in Section 4 when it comes to understand the
determinants of the institutional transition.
Finally, let us examine the comparative statics with respect to polarization. Note
that under constraint 2 we get ∂µ
m
∂q < 0. The sign of this derivative implies that polariza-
tion guarantees a higher level of non-taxed resources, i.e. µm, to citizens. The intuition
behind this result is simple: since minorities are dominant, when they are small in size
(no polarization) they push for a high level of public amenities, i.e. 1 − µm because
P = q; when they are large in size (polarization) they prefer do not redistribute their
important material pay-off because particularism reduces when q → 12 . Put differently,
government activities increase with particularism and decrease with polarization in pres-
ence of dominant minorities. However, the sign of the derivative ∂l
m
∂q remains ambiguous.
An increase in q brings down both the levels of the redistribution rate µ and the labor
supply. Nonetheless, when q increases, the coordination cost ψ[q] drops which pushes
up labor supply. Which effect dominates depends on how the function ψ[q] is made.
4 The emergence of dominant minority-based regimes
We now move to the transition from dictatorship to dominant minority-based regimes
at equilibrium. We start with some considerations on the optimal behavior of dictators,
then we move to characterize the latter transitions when they occur.
4.1 The dictator/population game
We shall consider the following simple timing. First, the dictator sets its optimal redis-
tribution policy given the labor supply function of the citizens (3). To be precise, we
assume that the optimal choice of the dictator would be to set a level of redistribution
µA such that her expected pay-off, (R + wlA)(1 − µA) provided that the labor supply
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and the redistribution rate are in their admissible intervals. As we will see the positivity
of labor supply, will turn out to be problematic. Call µ∗A the optimal redistribution rate
of the dictator. Second, given µ∗A and µ
m, the representative member of the majority,
the unique group whose rebellion is essential in revolting against the dictator, compares
her payoff in the two alternative regimes and decides whether to revolt or not. If she
revolts, game over: the dictator is expelled outside the country and a new regime sets
in, a dominant minority-based regime. If not, the dictatorship continues.
It is important to note that by doing so, we do not allow the dictator to “strike back”
in our scheme. In other words, we do not award her a strategic advantage allowing her
to avert revolutions by revising her initial redistribution offer. This is common in the
intertemporal democratization games a` la Acemoglu and Robinson, see for example
Boucekkine et al. (2016). Here, we have a one-period game and assuming our one-
shot game is acceptable. The main reason however behind our simplification is, as one
can guess, purely computational: if we go along the Boucekkine et al. (2016) line, we
will have plenty of cases studies, some not tractable, without changing the main results
qualitatively. We therefore stick to this simple dictator/population game.
We now devote a few sentences to the simple dictator’s optimal decision-making. It
can be trivially established that the maximization of dictator’s payoff (R + wlA)(1 −
µA) with respect to µA given the labor supply function (3) delivers µinA =
√
γ
R+w as
interior solution. Now, again trivially, this interior solution cannot always satisfy the
non-negativity of labor supply constraint as stipulated in Constraint 1: µA ≥ µA with
γ < w, where µA is the redistribution level under dictatorship assuring zero labor supply.
Clearly, there exists a threshold value for resources, say RA ≡ w
(
w
γ − 1
)
such that
µin < µA for all R > RA. In such a case, the optimal solution for the dictator is to set
µ∗A = µ
A. From now on, we assume the following:
Assumption 1. The country owns a level of natural resources such that R > RA.
Beside simplifying computations, the assumption above has two other virtues. First,
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the reference dictator’s policy (which turns to be optimal under the assumption) implies
a reference labor supply equal to zero, which is a quite appealing and transparent basis to
study the trade-off between dictatorship and dominant-minority based regimes. Clearly,
the latter have already a disadvantage with respect to the former in terms of leisure.
Would the fiscal particularistic scheme compensate for this deficit in leisure by allowing
for more consumption of majority member, thus fostering revolts against dictators?
Second, as illustrated in Section 2, labor supply might decrease with resources, especially
above a certain level of resources. Our assumption is from this point of view particularly
appealing. We now move to the study of transitions.
4.2 Transitions
As previously discussed, the dictator chooses a level of redistribution µA = γw which
sets to zero the labor supply of citizens if assumption 1 holds. To explain revolutionary
movements in resources-rich labor-poor countries, we only concentrate on the pay-off of
the majority since successful revolution can only be launched if they are at least backed
by the majority. Whether the latter will rebel at time t or not depends on the following
comparison:
uA,M [µA] ≶ uM [µm]
where uA,M [µA] is the utility accruing to the majority under autocracy and the associated
optimal redistribution, µA, and uM [µm] designates the utility of the majority under
the post-revolution regime. In such a case µm corresponds to the preferred policy of
the dominant minority group, as defined by equation (10). Clearly, there will be no
revolution whatever the level of redistribution if uA,M [µA] > uM [µm]. Define with
f [q, γ,R,w] = uA,M [µA] − uM [µm]. Using equations (1)-(6), we get the fundamental
equation the revolution condition in countries owning a sufficiently high level of natural
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resources:
f [q, γ,R,w] =
γR
w
−
(
(1− µm)(1− q)(lmw +R)
q
+ µm(lmw +R)
)
(1−ψ[q])−γ log(1−lm)
(12)
with µm and lm defined by equations (10) and (11), respectively.
The sign of the above equation heavily depends on parameters R, γ,w but also on
the composition of the civil society, q. In our particular setting the parameter q has a
crucial role. Indeed, it represents the particularistic character of the public redistribution
system as well as the level of polarization into the civil society. The latter also determines
the level of coordination costs when citizens revolt against the autocrat. For the sake of
simplicity and economic insight, we start separately studying the two extreme cases of
polarized societies (q = 12) and quasi-homogeneous societies (q tends to 1). We conclude
with the appraisal with the general heterogeneous case where q ∈ [12 , 1].
4.2.1 Polarized Societies
First of all, note that when the society is perfectly polarized, i.e. q = 12 , coordination
costs are maximal. The root in equation (10), that is φm[q, γ,R,w] = γ2(q − 1)2 +
4γq(2q − 1)(1 − ψ[q])(R + w), reduces to γ24 . When q = 12 equations (10) and (11)
reduces to µm = 1 and lm = 1 − γw(1−ψ[q]) , respectively. We can therefore rewrite the
revolution condition (12) as follows:
f
[
1
2
, γ, R,w
]
=
(R+ w)
(
γ − w (1− ψ [12]))
w
− γ log
[
γ
w
(
1− ψ [12])
]
(13)
Proposition 3. Under Assumption 1, the majority always revolts when q = 12 .
Proof. The proof is given in appendix B.3.
Proposition 3 tells us that perfect polarization leads people to revolt independently
of preferences for leisure, level of resources and wage rate. This might look strange at
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first glance since the cost of revolting is larger when citizens are increasingly polarized.
However, the degree of polarization, as captured by q, is also a determinant of the redis-
tribution in the post-revolution period as it affects the right-hand side of the equation
(12). It follows that full polarization is a sufficient condition for rebelling against the
autocratic elite. This is an important result which shed lights on the role that population
composition might have on institutional changes when labor choices, political decisions
and heterogeneity in population composition are all taken into account. In the tradi-
tional democratization model with homogeneous population (Acemoglu and Robinson,
2006) and its extensions to resource-rich countries (see Boucekkine et al., 2016), the
role of revolution cost is decisive. In our setting with heterogeneous population, revo-
lution occurs systematically under full polarization even though the cost of revolution
is maximal. The role of polarization in social conflicts has already been outlined in the
economic and political science literatures (see a survey in Esteban and Schneider, 2008).
Quite naturally, it plays a central role in our theory, it even dominates the revolution
cost effect, at least in the fully polarized societies case studied here. We shall see that
it keeps on playing a crucial role in the more general case studied in Section 4.2.3.
We can dig deeper in the current case under scrutiny and extract further interesting
results. First, note that when societies are perfectly polarized, inter-groups inequalities
tend to disappear and particularism collapses to its minimum level P = 12 . Second,
when q = 12 , the policy µ
m = 1, meaning that redistribution between groups will not
take place. The following corollary clarifies this claim.
Corollary 1. When q = 12 then c
M = cm > cA.
Proof. The proof is given in appendix B.4.
Majority and minority members get all the same amount of consumptions, which is
larger enough than consumption under autocracy to compensate the loss in leisure.
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4.2.2 Quasi-homogeneous Societies
Consider now the other possible extreme case, that is q tends to 1. In contrast to the
previous case (q = 12), q cannot be equal to 1 in our setting as this would mean that the
division minority/majority vanishes. However, most of the magnitudes involved in the
model are continuous in q at q = 1, and we can take the limit of these magnitudes when q
tends to 1. In this scenario, the society is close to homogeneous. Thus, coordination costs
tend to their minimal level ψ[1]. When q tends to 1, we get φm[q, γ,R,w] = 4(R+w)(1−
ψ[1]). Using equations (10) and (11) we can easily derive that lm = 1− (R+w)γ
w
√
(R+w)γ(1−ψ[1])
and µm = γ√
(R+w)γ(1−ψ[1]) ∈ (0, 1). However, note that when q tends to 1, labor supply
is positive if and only if R < w
(
w(1−ψ[1])
γ − 1
)
. Since, RA > w
(
w(1−ψ[1])
γ − 1
)
, when
countries own sufficiently high levels of resources, that is R > RA, we observe lm = 0
in the post-revolution regime with dominant minorities. We can therefore rewrite the
revolution condition (12) as follows:
f [1, γ, R,w] = Rγ
(
1
w
− 1− ψ[1]√
(R+ w)γ(1− ψ[1])
)
(14)
Proposition 4. Under assumption 1, the majority never revolts when q tends to 1.
Proof. The proof is given in appendix B.5.
Proposition 4 states that in quasi-homogeneous societies revolutions against the dic-
tator do not occur. This is symmetric to the full polarization configuration analyzed
just above: revolution will not occur even though the cost of revolution is minimal.
Again, the composition of population is key. The intuition behind this extreme outcome
is quite simple. When q → 1, the large majority of citizens belong to the same group
and particularism tends to its maximum level, P → 1. This can be hardly acceptable by
the majority, which ends up preferring autocracy. Proposition 4 shows clearly why this
is so: in this extreme case, majority members will consume definitely less than under
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autocracy, and will never accept the dominance of such a small minority. Corollary 2
clarifies this result.
Corollary 2. When q → 1 then cM < cA.
Proof. The proof is given in appendix B.6.
This is an interesting complementary result to the former extreme case: for revolu-
tions to be launched and transitions from autocracy to minority dominant-based regimes
to occur, the minority has to be large enough. In other terms, some level of polarization
should prevail.
The extreme results obtained for q = 12 and q tends to 1 emphasize one crucial
issue that we can only take into account by considering intermediate scenarios: the
role that polarization might have in explaining coordination costs and revolutionary
movements against autocracy. We shall therefore consider the more general case, that
is an heterogeneous society in which q ∈ (12 , 1) to check the role that both productivity,
polarization and rents from natural resources might have to explain institutional changes
and the emergence of elite-biased democracy.
4.2.3 Heterogeneous Societies
When societies are composed of different groups of citizens with given sizes, the transition
problem from autocracy to dominant minority-based regime becomes quite involved. A
probable key determinant of the problem is the magnitude of natural resources.13 One
obvious way to view this role is to come back to the comparative statics results, that
is Proposition 2. The picture is quite involved. According to the latter proposition,
as the level of windfall resources goes up, labor supply of individuals under dominant
minority, irrespective of their group membership, goes down. This means that labor
income drops and it is unclear what the total impact on wealth would be, and this
13We shall focus here on this wealth component for the connection with the resource curse literature.
As we shall see just below, this does not mean at all that the labor market does not matter.
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said without having incorporated yet the impact on redistribution of the initial rise in
resources. It results that the impact of natural resources income is highly nontrivial in
our framework. The other highly probable key determinant of institutional change is the
level of polarization, as this transpires from the analysis displayed just above for extreme
population composition configurations. Indeed, under full polarization, revolution will
take place whatever the level of resources, as explained in Section 4.2.1. Again the
comparative statics proposition shows however how analytically involved the problem
outside these extreme cases is, with a general cost function ψ[q].
In this section, we show that the transition problem can be deeply characterized with
both the level of resources and the extent of polarization at least for generic specifications
of the latter cost function. To this end, we will assume that the cost function takes the
tent form, that is ψ[q] = 1 − q for q ∈ (12 , 1). The tent function has been chosen for
the sake of analytical tractability, but it is highly useful to isolate the main economic
implications of our model.
Still, even in the tent case, the results are highly nontrivial and a few steps have to
be taken. Consider the two following preliminary properties.
Lemma 1. Set R¯[q] = qw(wq−γ)(2q−1)γ . If q ∈
(
1
2 , 1
)
and R = R¯[q] > RA, then lm = 0 and
f [q, γ, R¯[q], w] < 0: people always revolt against the elites when assumption 1 holds.
Proof. The proof is given in appendix B.7.
Lemma 2. Set q˜ = 1 − γw . If q ∈
(
1
2 , 1− γw
)
then RA < R¯[q], while if q ∈ (1− γw , 1)
then RA > R¯[q].
Proof. The proof is given in appendix B.8.
Lemma 1 highlights the role that rents from natural resources might have in explain-
ing revolutionary movements. Given q, when countries own a level of natural resources
R = R¯[q], citizens choose in a dominant minority regime the same labor supply as in the
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autocracy but they ask for a higher level of redistribution. Since µm = γwq > µ
A = γw ,
citizens will always revolt against the elites when R = R¯[q]. This result implies that for
different levels of rents from natural resources if the autocrat redistributes the minimum
share µA = γw the majority of citizens may prefer support a dominant minority regime
characterized by a redistribution policy µm. However, this decision will crucially depend
on both rents from resources and polarization, as suggested by Lemma 2. The following
propositions clarify this latter claim.
Proposition 5. Under assumption 1, if q ∈ (12 , q˜) citizens always revolt against the
elites.
Proof. The proof is given in appendix B.9.
Proposition 6. Under assumption 1, if q ∈ (q˜, 1) there exists a threshold R˜[q] ≥ RA
such that: (i) if R˜[q] > RA then people revolt for R ∈ (RA, R˜[q]) and do not revolt for
R > R˜[q]; (ii) people never revolt for R˜[q] = RA.
Proof. The proof is given in appendix B.10.
The picture is now more complete. In a setting with dominant minorities, a different
composition of the population is one of the main drivers of income distribution after a
revolution is launched and a new political regime sets in, since the redistribution rate µm
is determined by the dominant minority. The size of the majority, q, and therefore the
level of polarization into the society, is one of the main determinants of the size of the
cake accruing to each group under democracy. When ψ[q] = 1−q, polarization increases
the coordination costs of citizens. However, the degree of polarization, as captured by
q, is also a determinant of the particularistic redistribution under dominant minority
regime, that is P = q. In particular, when polarization is sufficiently high, that is q < q˜,
the majority will always revolt against the elites, as suggested by Proposition 5. When,
the societies is more homogeneous, that is q > q˜, rents from natural resources are crucial
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Figure 11: Heterogeneous Societies when q ∈ ( 12 , q˜): RA < R¯[q]
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Figure 12: Heterogeneous Societies when q ∈ (q˜, 1): RA > R¯[q]
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to determine protests against the autocratic regime. Proposition 6 shows that countries
engaging in revolutions tend to be slightly less resource-rich than other countries, as
suggested by stylized facts in Section 2, figure 9.
As in Boucekkine et al. (2016), two opposite forces are in action: the extent of
coordination costs and the size of the cake effect outlined just before. When q → 12 , co-
ordination costs are maximal but the size of the cake effect (for given coordination costs)
is also maximal. The policy is therefore the most favorable for majority members when
polarization tends to be complete because particularism P = q under dominant minority
regimes. In contrast, the size of the cake effect, defined above, tends to diminishing with
increasing majorities, that is when q → 1. When q → 12 , the size of the cake effect
dominates the coordination cost effect, and the majority rebels as depicted in Propo-
sition 3. When q → 1, the size of the cake effect tends to zero, while consumption is
strictly positive under dictatorship and zero redistribution, which offsets the advantage
of low coordination costs. Therefore citizens never revolt, as suggested by Proposition
4. More importantly, Proposition 5 suggests that, independently from the level of rents
from natural resources R, if polarization is sufficiently high q < q˜, citizens will always
revolt against the elites. However, natural resources play a key role in low polarized
countries, i.e. q > q˜. When resources are abundant, autocrats are able to redistribute
a minimum share of rents from natural resources and maintain the political power, as
suggested by Proposition 6.
Finally, one has to outline a crucial implication of our theory to explain real world
phenomena: the interplay between resource rents, polarization and labor market con-
ditions at the dawn of institutional change. Indeed it should be noted that an active
participation of citizens to labor market under dominant minority regime is a sufficient
condition to activate protests against the elite, as suggested by Figure 11. This result
emerges because we have assumed a benchmark case where minimum redistribution is
optimal under autocracy, i.e. µA = µA, and, consequently, labor supply is nil. This is
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an extreme scenario that simplifies and exemplifies the analysis and allows for sensible
economic interpretations.
First, when polarization is sufficiently low and, consequently, fiscal particularism
under dominant minority regime is sufficiently high, we do not observe an active par-
ticipation of citizens in the labor market. This particular scenario is strongly useful to
study resource-rich countries which, in general, show a high degree of fiscal particular-
ism and poor labor market development, as shown in Section 2. Second, even though
our benchmark theory suggests that positive labor supply is crucial to activate protests
against elites, this is only part of the story since labor productivity is not a sufficient
nor a necessary condition for institutional changes when societies tend to be homoge-
neous, as shown by Figure 12. Nevertheless, our theory highlights that the extent of
polarization is less stringent when labor productivity is poor. This claim follows from
the observation that ∂q˜∂w > 0: in poor-labor countries the threshold q˜ tends to be located
close to q = 12 . Put differently, given q and R, revolutions will be less likely. When, in
contrast, labor market is strongly developed and productivity is very high, citizens are
willing to participate to labor market under a dominant minority regime and they will
never accept taxation and minimum redistribution from the elites.14
4.3 A case study: Algeria
The theoretical results provided in the previous section put forward three main channels
to explain the multiplicity of political outcomes that MENA countries have experienced
during the last decades. These countries diverge in their economic, social and reli-
gious characteristics, indicating that institutional changes are based on a combination
of deep socio-economic factors and not solely on differences in resource windfalls. Even
though our theory suggests that polarization, and therefore fiscal particularism, have a
prominent role in explaining institutional changes from autocracies to dominant minor-
14Note that in the extreme case where w → ∞, we can observe that q˜ =→ 1: citizens will always
revolt.
43
ity regimes, we can also show how other national factors are decisive to trigger, or not,
political regime switching.
More precisely, a major implication of our theory is the following. For a given
level of resource windfalls, R, and polarization, q, the threshold q˜, which is critical for
institutional switch (see Propositions 5 and 6 just above), is increasing in the wage rate
w, a proxy for a country’s labor market conditions and economic development. When
parameter w goes up, then the analytical condition q < q˜ is met with larger probability.
Institutional changes may thus emerge independently from resource rents or polarization
of the population. Conversely, when parameter w is low, the level of rents from natural
resources and the degree of polarization are both important and interacting factors to
explain institutional change. For example, in highly homogeneous countries, that is
q > q˜, natural resources revenues play a key role.
The case of Algeria provides an interesting and dynamic application of our the-
ory. After the initial dictatorship of the socialist President Boumediene (1965-1978),
political institutions shifted from a Marxist economic and political regime (with any
kind of minority singularity repressed) to the minority dominant-based regime of the
just-ousted President Bouteflika (1999-2019). Figure 13 summarizes Algerian political
economy during this period. In the mid-80s, the world oil price collapsed, weakening
significantly the oil-dependent Algerian economy. In 1988, violent riots erupted, leading
to the breakdown of the single-party regime. The sharp fall in natural resources rents,
clearly visible in Figure 13, facilitated the satisfaction of condition i) in Proposition
6. Our theory can also explain the institutional dynamics observed after the civil war.
Three key developments can be highlighted. First, the rise of an Algerian dominant
minority in the last three decades led to more polarization, captured in Figure 13 by
stronger minority domination and greater fiscal particularism. This trend accelerated
during the third term of President Bouteflika (2009-2014), considered in V-Dem as a
regime change. Second, Figure 13 shows that growth performance was unimpressive,
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still oil-dependent, and often associated with negative total factor productivity. Third,
in 2014, the start of a new negative oil shock, which revealed itself to be persistent in
subsequent years, can be observed in Figure 13. Together, these events made, again, the
fulfillment of condition i) in Proposition 6 more likely. Polarization q increased, w fell
bringing down q˜, and R decreased. Indeed, in line with the predictions of our theory,
major public demonstrations led to the resignation of President Bouteflika in 2019.
Figure 13: The case of Algeria
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5 Conclusion
Based on the illuminating work of Haggard and Kaufman (2016) and Albertus and
Menaldo (2018), we have developed a theory of transitions from autocracies to domi-
nant minority-based regimes. While our concept of dominant minority-based regime is
not rigorously the same as the elite-based democracies highlighted in these two impor-
tant books, our approach shares some essential ingredients with the latter, in particular
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the role of dominant minorities in undermining the egalitarian foundations of the demo-
cratic project. While these minorities are connected with the former elites in Albertus
and Menaldo (2018) for example, ours are not. In our view, this makes our problem
more generic. Even from a more applied point of view, our theory has some inter-
est: it is able to explain institutional changes from autocracies to dominant minority
regimes in both polarized and non-polarized societies, resource-poor and resource-rich
countries, as well as labor-poor and labor-rich countries. In particular, it seems rea-
sonably applicable to track the institutional dynamics in resource-rich countries, which
after post-independence autocratic communist-like regimes, turn to be dominated by
minorities. The case of Algeria exemplifies such a class of countries (see Boucekkine and
Bouklia-Hassane (2011), for more details).
Clearly, fiscal particularism is a key ingredient of our theory. We have provided a
solid empirical basis for it, and also made clear its connection with dominant minorities
in practice. Our theory does not provide any theoretical foundation for this fiscal par-
ticularism. A natural candidate for that is to strengthen the connection with Albertus
and Menaldo, and give minorities an active pro-dictator role in the initial autocratic
period. Other channels, along with the theories around the paradox of power, are worth
exploring. In this paper, we have given priority to a more generic problem which in our
view is equally challenging.
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Appendix
A Useful checks
A.1 The Model with Universalistic Public Good
Assume that the total tax revenue (4) is equally shared between majority and minority
members. The budget constraints (5) and (6) can be respectively rewritten as follow:
cM =
[
(R+ wlM )µi +G
]
(1− ψ[q])
cm =
[
(R+ wlm)µi +G
]
(1− ψ[q])
with i ∈ {m,M}. As for the particularistic redistribution system the government budget
constraint is always binding since cMq + cm(1− q) = [R+ (lMq + lm(1− q)](1− ψ[q]).
Without loss of generality assume that ψ[q] = 0. Consider first that the represen-
tative agent of the minority is the strategic leader of the game. Therefore, the repre-
sentative agent of the majority moves first and maximizes utility (1) under the budget
constraint cM defined above and chooses her optimal labor supply:
lM = 1− γ
qw(1− µm) + wµm
Given majority labor supply, the representative agent of the dominant minority maxi-
mizes her utility under the budget constraint cm to derive:
lm = 1− γ
qw(1− µm) + w
Since minority members have de jure power, they will set the fiscal policy. Deriving their
utility with respect to µm one gets two solutions: µm = 1 and µm = q
2+q−1
(1−q)2 . The first
solution is compatible with local concavity if and only if q < 23 . The second solution,
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if and only if q > 23 . However, in the latter case, we observe that µ
m = q
2+q−1
(1−q)2 > 1.
Therefore the only acceptable solution is µm = 1. When µm → 1 we get that :
lM = lm = 1− γ
w
Therefore, the model with pure public good degenerates to the standard model of insti-
tutional changes without redistribution across groups of citizens.
Assume now that the strategic leader of the game is the representative agent of the
majority. Minority members move first and choose the following labor supply:
lm = 1− γ
w − qw(1− µM )
Given minority labor supply, the representative agent of the dominant majority maxi-
mizes utility under the budget constraint cm to derive:
lM = 1− γ
qw(1− µM ) + wµM
Deriving utility (1) with respect to policy, we get µM = {1+ 1
q2
− 3q ; 1}. The first solution
is not admissible since it is always negative. Again, the model with majority strategic
leader predicts that µM = 1 and lm = lM = 1 − γw . As for the dominant minority
scenario, the model degenerates to the benchmark case with only one group of citizens.
A.2 Second Order Conditions for a Maximum
Given the reaction function (8), minority members maximize (1) under the budget con-
straint (6). Solving both first order conditions for a maximum in terms of labor supply,
one gets :
lm[µm] = 1− γ
wµm(1− ψ[q])
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and
lm[µm] =
q
(
(µm)2(1− ψ[q])(2R+ w)− γ)− (µm)2R(1− ψ[q])
(µm)2(1− q)w(1− ψ[q])
Since the problem is quadratic, we derive two solutions for µm :
µm,1 =
2γq
γ(1− q) +√γ (γ(1− q)2 + 4q(2q − 1)(1− ψ[q])(R+ w))
and
µm,2 = − 2γq
γ(1− q) +√γ (γ(1− q)2 + 4q(2q − 1)(1− ψ[q])(R+ w)) .
Using the above solutions and (9) we can derive two solutions for labor supply (say lm,1
and lm,2). To check if these solutions are stable we should the sign of the determinant.
We define the Hessian matrix of second partial derivatives as follows:
Hess (f [q, g, R,w]) =
 − γ(lm−1)2 w(1− ψ[q])
w(1− ψ[q]) 2qγ
(q−1)(µm)3
 (15)
The determinant of the Hessian is therefore given by:
det = − 2qγ
2
(lm − 1)2(q − 1)(µm)3 − w
2(ψ[q]− 1)2
Since the sign of the determinant is ambiguous, we should check local stability when
solutions are given by the following two couples of policy/labor supply: (i): µm = µm,1
and lm = lm,1; (ii): µm = µm,2 and lm = lm,2. For the first solution, (i), we derive:
det =
w2(ψ[q]− 1)2√γ (γ(q − 1)2 + 4q(2q − 1)(1− ψ[q])(R+ w))
γ(1− q) > 0
while for the second, (ii):
det = −w
2(ψ[q]− 1)2√γ (γ(q − 1)2 + 4q(2q − 1)(1− ψ[q])(R+ w))
γ(1− q) < 0.
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Since the second solution is negative, the problem is convex at local level. Therefore we
exclude this solution.
B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is trivial. If labor supplies are equal, then particularism is inversely related
to polarization: as polarization decreases (that is q goes to 1), the larger the share of
national transfers accruing to the minority.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Define for simplicity φm[q, γ,R,w] = γ2(q−1)2+4γq(2q−1)(1−ψ[q])(R+w) ≡ φm. First
of all, we check the sign of its partial derivatives: ∂φ
m
∂w =
∂φm
∂R = 4γq(2q−1)(1−ψ[q]) > 0,
∂φm
∂ψ[q] = −4q(2q − 1)(R + w)γ < 0. The derivative with respect to group size ∂φ
m
∂q =
γ
(
4(4q − 1)(R+ w)− 2γ(1− q) + 4(R+ w)((1− 2q)q ∂ψ[q]∂q + (1− 4q)ψ[q])
)
. We can show,
after some tedious algebra, that ∂φ
m
∂q > 0.
15
First, consider the policy µm. The partial derivatives ∂µ
m
∂w = −
qγ ∂φ
m
∂w√
φm(γ(1−q)+√φm)2
<
0, ∂µ
m
∂R = −
qγ ∂φ
m
∂R√
φm(γ(1−q)+√φm)2
< 0, ∂µ
m
∂ψ[q] = −
qγ ∂φ
m
∂ψ[q]√
φm(γ(1−q)+√φm)2
> 0, because ∂φ
m
∂w > 0,
∂φm
∂R > 0 and
∂φm
∂ψ[q] < 0, defined above. The partial derivative
∂µm
∂q =
γ
(
2γ
√
φm+2φm−q ∂φm
∂q
)
√
φm(γ(1−q)+√φm)2
requires more algebra. The sign depends on the numerator because ∂φ
m
∂q > 0. Using
∂φm
∂q
defined above, we get ∂µ
m
∂q =
2γ
(
γ(1−q)+√φm+2q(R+w)
(
ψ[q]−1+q(2q−1) ∂ψ[q]
∂q
))
√
φm(γ(1−q)+√φm)2
, with ∂ψ[q]∂q < 0
for all q ∈ (12 , 1). Using φm it can be shown that the numerator is always negative. It
follows that, ∂µ
m
∂q < 0.
16
Now consider the labor supply under dominant minority regime. The derivative with
respect to the wage rate, ∂l
m
∂w =
(2q−1)γ
(
2(q−1)Rγ√φm+2Rφm+w(R+w) ∂φm
∂w
)
√
φm(γ(1−q)+√φm)2
> 0. Indeed,
15The full algebra of the latter claim is not reported here but is available upon request.
16As for ∂φ
m
∂q
the algebra is not reported here but is available upon request.
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using ∂φ
m
∂w = 4q(2q − 1)γ(1 − ψ[q]), we can easily rewrite ∂l
m
∂w = 4q(2q − 1)w(R +
w)γ(1− ψ[q]) +√φm + 2φmR > 0. The derivative with respect to R is given by ∂lm∂R =
− (2q−1)γ
(
2(q−1)γ√φm+2φmR−(R+w) ∂φm
∂R
)
√
φm(γ(1−q)+√φm)2
. Using ∂φ
m
∂R = 4q(2q − 1)γ(1 − ψ[q]) and φm, we
find that: ∂l
m
∂R =
γ(1−2q)
w
√
γ2(q−1)2+4γq(2q−1)(1−ψ[q])(R+w) < 0. The derivative with respect
to coordination costs ∂l
m
∂ψ[q] =
(2q−1)(R+w)γ ∂φm
∂ψ[q]√
φm(γ(1−q)+√φm)2
< 0 since ∂φ
m
∂ψ[q] < 0. The sign of the
derivative ∂l
m
∂q =
(R+w)γ
(
2γ
√
φm−4φm+(2q−1) ∂φm
∂q
)
√
φm(γ(1−q)+√φm)2
is, however, ambiguous.
Finally, consider the consumption level of the minority. The derivative with respect
to R is given by ∂c
m
∂R =
q(1−ψ[q])−
∂φm
∂R
2
√
φm
1−q . Using
∂φm
∂R = 4γq(2q − 1)(1 − ψ[q]), we can
rewrite ∂c
m
∂R =
q(1−ψ[q])(2γ(1−2q)+√φm)
(1−q)√φm . The sign depends on 2γ(1 − 2q) +
√
φm. Using
the definition of φm, after some algebra, we find that the latter is strictly positive. Thus,
∂cm
∂R > 0. The derivative
∂cm
∂w =
q(1−ψ[q])−
∂φm
∂w
2
√
φm
1−q . Proceeding as above, using
∂φm
∂w , we
derive ∂c
m
∂w =
q(1−ψ[q])(2γ(1−2q)+√φm)
(1−q)√φm . Thus, as for R,
∂φm
∂w > 0. The derivative derivative
∂cm
∂ψ[q] =
q(R+w)+
∂φ
∂ψ[q]
2
√
φ
1−q . Using the definition of φ, it can be proven that the numerator
is strictly negative. Therefore, we get that ∂c
m
∂ψ[q] < 0. Finally, the derivative
∂cm
∂q is
ambiguous as for labor supply.
As to the consumption of the majority members, the following results can be easily
obtained. The derivative ∂c
M
∂R =
(2q−1) ∂φ
m
∂R√
φm
+4(1−q)q(1−ψ[q])
4q2
> 0, since ∂φ
m
∂R > 0. The
derivative ∂c
M
∂w =
(2q−1) ∂φ
m
∂w√
φm
+4(1−q)q(1−ψ[q])
4q2
> 0 since ∂φ
m
∂w > 0. The derivative
∂cM
∂q is
again ambiguous. Finally, one gets: ∂c
M
∂ψ[q] < 0. Of course,
∂cA
∂w < 0 and
∂cA
∂R > 0, given
cA = Rγw .
B.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Assume q = 12 . When a society is perfectly polarised and γ = 0, one can easily derive that
f
[
1
2 , 0, R,w
]
= −((1−ψ [12])(R+w)) < 0. When preferences for leisure are at the maxi-
mum level compatible with constraint 2, i.e. γ = w(1−ψ [12]), we observe from equation
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(13) that f
[
1
2 , 1− ψ
[
1
2
]
, R,w
]
= 0. The function f [12 , γ, R,w] is continuous on γ ∈[
0, 1− ψ [12]]. Notice that when q = 12 , the derivative ∂f [ 12 ,γ,R,w]∂γ = Rw − log [ γw(1−ψ[ 12 ])
]
.
Under constraint 2, the argument of the log is lower than 1. It follows that, under
Assumption 1,
∂f [ 1
2
,γ,R,w]
∂γ > 0 for any R > R
A and w and γ ∈ [0, w(1− ψ [12]]. Since
f
[
1
2 , 0, R,w
]
< 0 and f
[
1
2 , w(1− ψ
[
1
2
]
), R,w
]
= 0, Proposition 3 holds trivially.
B.4 Proof of Corollary 1
Using equations (5) and (6) it is easy to verify that the limit of the difference cm − cM
goes to 0 when q → 12 . Since labor supply is the same for all citizens and 1−qq = q1−q
when q = 12 , it follows directly from equations (5) and (6) that c
m = cM . Note also that
cA = Rγw . When q =
1
2 , we derive c
M = cm = (R+w)(1− ψ[q]). Under constraint (2) it
is always true that cM = cm > cA.
B.5 Proof of Proposition 4
To prove Proposition 4 consider the following. When q → 1 the labor supply lm is
positive if and only if R < w
(
w(1−ψ[1])
γ − 1
)
. Under assumption 1, we derive that
lm = 0, since RA > w
(
w(1−ψ[1])
γ − 1
)
. Note that the limit of equation (14) when R →
w
(
w(1−ψ[1])
γ − 1
)
= 0, while the limit when R → ∞ goes to ∞. Moreover, the partial
derivative of equation (14) when q → 1 gives ∂f [1,γ,R,w]∂R = γw −
(R+2w)
√
(R+w)γ(1−ψ[1])
2(R+w)2
.
This derivative is positive when 2γ(R + w)2 − w(R + 2w)√(R+ w)γ(1− ψ[1]) > 0.
Under assumption 1 and constraint 2, the latter equation is always positive. Therefore,
given that for q → 1 equation (14) is a strictly increasing function of R, Proposition 4
holds trivially.
B.6 Proof of Corollary 2
. Note that when q → 1, we get cM = √(R+ w)γ(1− ψ[q]) − γ. Since cM − cA =√
(R+ w)γ(1− ψ[q])− γ(R+w)w < 0 under assumption 1, Corollary 2 holds trivially.
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B.7 Proof of Lemma 1
Using (11), we derive that lm = 0 when R = R¯[q], with R¯[q] = qw(wq−γ)(2q−1)γ . Note that
R¯[q] > 0 under constraint 2. Using equation (9) when R = R¯[q] and lm = 0, we get
that µm = γwq >
γ
q = µ
A and f [q, γ, R¯[q], w] = (1−q)R(γ−qw)qw < 0, under constraint
2. Therefore, under assumption 1, when R = R¯[q] > RA the function (12) is strictly
negative and people always revolt for all q ∈ (12 , 1).
B.8 Proof of Lemma 2
The comparison between RA = w
(
w
γ − 1
)
and R¯[q] = qw(qw−γ)γ(2q−1) , gives directly that
RA < R¯[q] when q ∈ (12 , 1− γw). and RA > R¯[q] when q ∈ (1− γw , 1).
B.9 Proof of Proposition 5
By Lemma 2 we know that if q ∈ (12 , q˜), then RA < R¯[q]. Using Lemma 1 we also
know that when R = R¯[q], lm = 0 and f [q, γ, R¯[q], w] < 0. Observe now that lm = 0
for all R > R¯[q], while lm > 0 for all R < R¯[q], since ∂l
m
∂R < 0 by Proposition 2.
Solving equation (12) when R > R¯[q], gives that f [q, γ,R,w] = 0 when R = R˜[q], with
R˜[q] =
w(qw−γ)(γ−(1−q)2w)
q((1−q)w−γ)2 . Note also that limR→∞ f [q, γ,R,w] =∞
(
q − 1 + γw
)
. Since
the limit is strictly negative ∀ q ∈ (12 , q˜), it follows that for all R > R¯[q], f [q, γ,R,w] < 0
because the function (12) can take the value of zero once in the point R˜[q] that cannot
be larger than R¯[q]. When R ∈ (RA, R¯[q]), lm > 0. We know by Proposition 3 that
when q = 12 the function f
[
1
2 , γ, R,w
]
< 0 for all R > RA. Therefore, when R = RA,
f
[
1
2 , γ, R,w
] ≤ 0. Note also that when q = q˜ and R = RA we get f [q˜, γ, RA, w] = −(w−
2γ) < 0. To prove that the function f [q, γ,RA, w] < 0 for all R ∈ (RA, R¯[q]), consider the
general formf [q, γ,RA, w] = Rγw −q
(
(1−µm)(1−q)(lmw+R)
q + µ
m(lmw +R)
)
−γ(log[1−lm]).
The latter function is zero when lm = 1 − Ω[ewχ[q]+R(χ[q]+
γ
w )wχ[q]]
wχ[q] , with Ω[.] defining the
Lambert function and χ[q] = q−1+µm(1−2q) < 0. Since the argument of the Lambert
function is strictly negative we have that Ω[.] < 0. Therefore, we should necessarily have
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that lm < 1. However, note that if Ω[e
wχ[q]+R(χ[q]+ γw )wχ[q]]
wχ[q] ≥ 1, the function f [q, γ,RA, w]
can be zero if and only if lm ≤ 0, that is excluded when R ∈ (RA, R¯[q]), by proposition
2 and by non-negativity of labor supply. Using the properties of the Lambert function,
we can observe that Ω[ewχ[q]+R(χ[q]+
γ
w )wχ[q]] > wχ[q]. Therefore, it necessarily follows
that f [q, γ,RA, w] < 0 when lm > 0, that is when R ∈ (RA, R¯[q]) (see Figure 11).
B.10 Proof of Proposition 6
When q ∈ (q˜, 1), we know from Lemma 2 that RA > R¯[q]. Therefore, lm = 0 ∀ R > RA.
First, note that limR→∞ f [q, γ,R,w] =∞
(
q − 1 + γw
)
is strictly positive when q ∈ (q˜, 1).
From the proof of Proposition 5 we also know the function f [q, γ,R,w] when lm = 0 is
zero when R = R˜[q], with R˜[q] =
w(qw−γ)(γ−(1−q)2w)
q((1−q)w−γ)2 . Since for R < R
A the function
(12) is no longer valid, two scenarios are possible when q ∈ (q˜, 1): (i) the function
f [q, γ,R,w] is negative close to RA. In this case, given that limR→∞ f [q, γ,R,w] > 0,
it must necessarily be that R˜[q] > RA, since the function f [q, γ,R,w] when lm = 0 can
take the value of zero only in the point R = R˜[q]. It follows that f [q, γ,R,w] < 0 for all
R ∈ (RA, R˜[q]) and that f [q, γ,R,w] > 0 for R > R˜[q]. (ii) the function f [q, γ,R,w] is
non-negative close to RA. In this case, it must necessarily be that R˜[q] ≤ RA because
limR→∞ f [q, γ,R,w] > 0. However, under assumption 1, it must be that R > RA.
Therefore f [q, γ,R,w] > 0 for all R > RA. Indeed, note that this result confirms
previous propositions: the limq→1 R˜[q] = RA, that is that people never revolt for all
R > RA, as suggested by Proposition 4; the limq→q˜ R˜[q] = +∞, and people always
revolt for all R > RA, as suggested by Proposition 5 (see Figure 12).
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